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PUBLIC DISCOURSE, EXPERT KNOWLEDGE, AND THE 
PRESS 
Joseph Blocher* 
Abstract: This Essay identifies and elaborates two complications raised by Robert Post’s 
Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom, and in doing so attempts to show how Post’s 
theory can account for constitutional protection of the press. The first complication is a 
potential circularity arising from the relationships between the concepts of democratic 
legitimation, public discourse, and protected social practices. Democratic legitimation 
predicates First Amendment coverage on participation in public discourse, whose boundaries 
are defined as those social practices necessary for the formation of public opinion. But close 
examination of the relationships between these three concepts raises the question of whether 
public discourse and social practices can do any analytic work independent of the value of 
democratic legitimation, or instead are simply labels for speech that furthers it. Consideration 
of the press helps to illuminate the problem and a potential solution. 
The second complication is the interface between expert knowledge and public discourse. 
Post’s theory of democratic competence convincingly explains how such knowledge is 
created and circulated outside of public discourse. But in order to inform self-governance, 
expert knowledge must ultimately be disseminated into public discourse. The theory does not 
yet account for how this happens, nor how such expert knowledge can serve an informative 
function, given that public discourse transmutes claims of expert knowledge into statements 
of opinion. Again, the press serves as an illustrative and important example. 
INTRODUCTION 
Robert Post’s Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom1 
explains our constitutional commitment to free speech in light of two 
central and sometimes conflicting principles: democratic legitimation 
and democratic competence. In doing so, the book employs concepts that 
Post has carefully crafted over the past few decades, including the 
constitutional concept of public discourse,2 the lexical priority of 
                                                   
* Assistant Professor, Duke Law School. Many thanks to Stuart Benjamin, Michael Gerhardt, Marin 
K. Levy, Robert Post, and Neil Siegel for valuable suggestions. The author retains the copyright in 
this article and authorizes royalty-free reproduction for non-profit purposes, provided any such 
reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the Washington Law Review. 
1. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012). 
2. See generally Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous 
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 
(1990) [hereinafter Post, Public Discourse]. 
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participatory democracy as a First Amendment principle,3 and the need 
to orient First Amendment doctrine around social practices rather than 
“speech as such.”4 Drawing heavily on that earlier work, this Essay 
attempts to identify and explore two ways in which those concepts are 
particularly hard to reconcile. First, it is difficult to maintain a 
conceptual thread through public discourse, protected social practices, 
and democratic legitimation while treating each of them as independent 
and important parts of First Amendment analysis. Second, Post’s theory 
raises intractable questions about how expert knowledge is disseminated 
into public discourse and how it should be treated once it arrives there. 
In the course of exploring those difficulties, this Essay also considers 
how Post’s theory can account for First Amendment protection of the 
press. 
Following the structure of the book, this Essay proceeds in two parts. 
Part I explores the relationships between public discourse, protected 
social practices, and democratic legitimation. Specifically, it asks 
whether the first two concepts define the boundaries of the third, or the 
other way around—whether, in other words, public discourse and 
protected social practices establish the boundaries of speech that furthers 
the principle of democratic legitimation, or whether they are simply 
labels for speech that does so. Part I begins, as Post does, with the 
proposition that the First Amendment must be interpreted in line with its 
core values.5 The primary value of First Amendment doctrine is 
democratic legitimation6—allowing speakers to communicate in public 
discourse7 and thereby experience themselves as participating in the 
                                                   
3. See generally Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477 
(2011) [hereinafter Post, Participatory Democracy]; Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a 
Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617 (2011) [hereinafter Post, Reply]. 
4. See generally Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 
1250 (1995) [hereinafter Post, Recuperating]. Throughout this Essay, I will use “social practices” as 
shorthand for this focus on context rather than substance. Post also uses terms like “forms of 
conduct,” “social roles,” and “communicative processes.” See infra notes 58–62 and accompanying 
text. 
5. POST, supra note 1, at 4 (“The actual contours of First Amendment doctrine cannot be 
explained merely by facts in the world; they must instead reflect the law’s efforts to achieve 
constitutional values.”); Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 477 (“I begin with the 
premise that interpreting the First Amendment involves explicating our national dedication to 
freedom of expression.”). 
6. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 482 (“In my view, the best possible 
explanation of the shape of First Amendment doctrine is the value of democratic self-governance.”). 
7. Id. (“The value of democratic legitimation occurs . . . specifically through processes of 
communication in the public sphere.”). 
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shared project of self-government.8 
Defining the boundaries of public discourse is therefore an essential, 
difficult, and inherently normative goal.9 In pursuit of that goal, Post 
argues that public discourse is not defined by the content of specific 
speech acts, but by “the forms of communication constitutionally 
deemed necessary for formation of public opinion.”10 As in his previous 
work, Post focuses on these forms of communication, looking to 
“particular social practices”11 rather than “speech as such.”12 He is 
thereby able to construct a rich First Amendment theory that is grounded 
in current doctrine, accounts for the social nature of speech, and leaves 
necessary room for argumentation and change.13 
But as Part I of this Essay attempts to show, Post’s approach also 
raises conceptual difficulties. If particular social practices are 
constitutionally protected because they constitute public discourse, and 
public discourse is defined by those practices and protected because it 
furthers them, then the two concepts appear circular and disconnected 
from the value of democratic legitimation, which is what justifies their 
protection in the first place.14 On the other hand, if the value of 
democratic legitimation is doing all the work, then public discourse and 
protected social practices are simply labels for protected speech, not 
                                                   
8. Id. at 483 (“The function of public discourse is to enable persons to experience the value of 
self-government.”). 
9. Id. at 488 (“Because the boundaries of public discourse are inherently normative, value 
judgments must be made about the forms of speech that are and are not necessary for the 
maintenance of democracy.”); Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 671 (“To classify speech as 
public discourse is, in effect, to deem it relevant to this collective process of self-definition and 
decisionmaking. There is obviously no theoretically neutral way in which this can be done.”). 
10. POST, supra note 1, at 15 (citing, inter alia, Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 
(1995)). 
11. See Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1250 (“The Court has imagined that the purpose of 
First Amendment jurisprudence is to protect speech as such. But in fact the constitutional values 
advanced to justify this protection inhere not in speech as such, but rather in particular social 
practices.”). 
12. Id.; see also Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 477–78 (“[T]he First 
Amendment does not and should not protect ‘speech as such,’ as Justice Souter once put it.” (citing 
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting))). 
13. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 618 (“[T]he task of explicating our own moral commitments 
inevitably leaves ample room for critical intelligence.”). I take Tim Scanlon to be addressing a 
similar point when he writes that “[t]he dialectical interplay between the guiding interests of a right 
and strategies for protecting these interests is what allows rights to grow and change.” See T.M. 
Scanlon, Why Not Base Free Speech on Autonomy or Democracy?, 97 VA. L. REV. 541, 542 (2011). 
14. As explained in more detail below in Part I.A, even assuming that I have read Post correctly, 
this criticism would not necessarily mean that the concept of democratic legitimation is based on a 
circularity, nor that it is empty, only that problems seem to arise when the concepts of public 
discourse and social practices are used to define one another. 
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substantive parts of the analysis. 
This Essay considers a third understanding: that social practices, 
which together constitute public discourse, are proxies for identifying 
speech whose content presumptively furthers the principle of democratic 
legitimation. This differs from Post’s approach inasmuch as it treats 
public discourse and social practices as having evidentiary, rather than 
intrinsic, value. Under the proxy approach, determining whether a 
particular social practice forms part of the “structural skeleton that is 
necessary, although not sufficient, for public discourse to serve the 
constitutional value of democracy”15 requires a continuous assessment of 
whether the speech occurring within it tends to be “normatively 
necessary for influencing public opinion.”16 
The press provides a particularly useful lens through which to 
examine these relationships between public discourse, social practices, 
and democratic legitimation. Post writes that “[m]edia speech 
is . . . unique because it carries within it [a] prima facie claim to 
constitute public discourse, a claim based entirely on the manner of its 
distribution rather than on its content.”17 But despite this unique claim, 
First Amendment doctrine has never extended protection to the press 
qua press. Why not? Moreover, many forms of “media speech” are in 
fact denied full First Amendment protection—copyrighted speech and 
commercial advertising, for example. Why? These questions and other 
important issues, like the changing membership and mechanisms of the 
press, raise serious complications with treating the press as a part of 
public discourse. 
While Part I of this Essay focuses on public discourse and the value 
of democratic legitimation, Part II focuses on the second major First 
Amendment value Post identifies: democratic competence. As he points 
out, effective democracy depends on more than just the ability to 
participate—it requires expert knowledge.18 But “[t]he continuous 
discipline of peer judgment, which virtually defines expert knowledge, is 
quite incompatible with deep and fundamental First Amendment 
                                                   
15. Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1276. 
16. POST, supra note 1, at 18. 
17. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 678. As Post puts it in the book, “First Amendment 
coverage presumptively extends to media for the communication of ideas, like newspapers, 
magazines, the Internet, or cinema, which are the primary vehicles for the circulation of the texts 
that define and sustain the public sphere.” POST, supra note 1, at 20. It follows that, “[i]n the 
absence of strong countervailing reasons, whatever is said within such media is covered by the First 
Amendment.” Id. 
18. See, e.g., POST, supra note 1, at 32, 35. 
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doctrines,” such as those governing viewpoint and content neutrality.19 
As Post puts it, “[d]emocratic competence is thus both incompatible with 
democratic legitimation and required by it.”20 The bulk of his book is 
devoted to reconciling the two, or at least sketching the terms of a 
détente. 
Part II explores two particularly difficult questions of democratic 
competence: how expert knowledge enters into public discourse, and 
how public discourse can accommodate it once it arrives there. Post 
devotes considerable attention to the creation and circulation of expert 
knowledge outside of public discourse. But in order to inform public 
discourse—which Post considers an essential function of democratic 
competence21—such knowledge must at some point enter into it. How 
does that dissemination happen? Does it, like the creation of expert 
knowledge, require disciplinarity?22 Moreover, as Post notes, “[w]ithin 
public discourse, traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically 
transmutes claims of expert knowledge into assertions of opinion.”23 
How, then, does expert knowledge in public discourse add any value 
above and beyond other claims of opinion? 
In assessing democratic competence, Post focuses predominately on 
the role of universities in creating and disseminating expert knowledge.24 
The press, too, engages in information-producing activities that are 
essential to its role but not a part of public discourse—newsgathering, 
for example—and sometimes creates expert knowledge through 
investigative journalism and the like. Perhaps, then, the press is also 
entitled to constitutional protection under the principle of democratic 
competence. This conclusion raises its own complications, some of 
which overlap with those Post raises with regard to universities. Does 
the press have its own disciplinary standards? Are they worthy of 
respect? How can one define the boundaries of the press, and how do 
those changing boundaries impact its disciplinarity? 
                                                   
19. Id. at 9; see also id. at 31 (“The creation of reliable disciplinary knowledge must accordingly 
be relegated to institutions that are not controlled by the constitutional value of democratic 
legitimation.”). 
20. Id. at 34. 
21. See infra notes 135–40 and accompanying text. 
22. By disciplinarity, I mean the same thing as Post does—the observation of a discipline’s own 
internal norms for veracity. See Robert Post, Debating Disciplinarity, 35 CRITICAL INQUIRY 749, 
751 (2009) (“When we speak of a discipline, therefore, we speak not merely of a body of 
knowledge but also of a set of practices by which that knowledge is acquired, confirmed, 
implemented, preserved, and reproduced.”). 
23. POST, supra note 1, at 44. 
24. See id. at 61–95. 
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It is beyond this Essay’s scope, and its author’s ability, to answer all 
of these questions. The more limited goal here is to explore possible 
tensions among some of the major themes animating Post’s book and his 
other trailblazing First Amendment scholarship. These include the 
complicated relationships between public discourse, protected social 
practices, and democratic legitimation, and the difficulty of 
accommodating expert knowledge within public discourse. In evaluating 
these themes, this Essay also tries to apply Post’s theory to what is 
perhaps the most constitutionally prominent speech practice of all: 
journalism.25 
I.  PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND THE PRESS 
The relationship between public discourse and the social practices 
comprising it is central to the notion of democratic legitimation, which is 
the primary principle in Post’s First Amendment theory.26 And yet the 
normative account of their constitutional value appears somewhat 
circular: particular social practices are protected to the extent that they 
constitute public discourse, while public discourse is protected to the 
extent that it consists of those social practices. The animating value 
underlying each is democratic legitimation, but the process of 
identifying when they are at work seems to lead to circular (or perhaps 
“public spherical”) results. This Part describes that complication, and 
asks whether close consideration of the press as a First Amendment 
institution can help resolve it. 
A. Public Discourse, Social Practices, and Democratic Legitimation 
Post’s work begins with the premise that it is only possible to 
understand First Amendment doctrine in light of the values and 
principles the Amendment seeks to effectuate.27 Identifying those values, 
of course, is perhaps the central quest in free speech scholarship.28 
                                                   
25. See infra Parts I.B and II.B (analyzing constitutional coverage of press activities in light of 
the principles of democratic legitimation and democratic competence). For the purposes of this 
Essay, I treat the press and journalism as more or less interchangeable concepts. I realize that this is 
a contested proposition. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for 
the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012) (arguing 
that the Press Clause was understood as giving protection not just to journalists, but more broadly to 
everyone using the technology of the press). 
26. POST, supra note 1, at 37 (“[T]he value of democratic legitimation trumps that of democratic 
competence.”). 
27. See sources cited supra note 5. 
28. The Virginia Law Review recently collected a series of essays by preeminent First 
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Individual autonomy and the marketplace of ideas are often treated as 
the leading candidates, but Post’s book begins by showing that they are 
flawed at best.29 He argues instead that the primary—although not 
perfect or sole30—value behind the First Amendment is “democratic 
legitimation,” the notion that “First Amendment coverage should extend 
to all efforts deemed normatively necessary for influencing public 
opinion.”31 
The animating value of democratic legitimation, Post says, is “the 
hope that persons who are permitted the opportunity to make public 
opinion responsive to their own subjective, personal views might come 
to regard themselves as the potential authors of the laws that bind 
them.”32 Thus “those who are subject to law should also experience 
themselves as the authors of law,” and should have “the possibility of 
influencing public opinion.”33 In order to achieve this, the First 
Amendment “requires . . . that public opinion remain continuously open 
to revision.”34 
This view of the First Amendment draws strength from theories based 
on individual autonomy (what Post calls the “ethical” view), the 
marketplace of ideas (“cognitive”), and democratic functioning 
                                                   
Amendment scholars addressing Post’s arguments and presenting others. See James Weinstein, 
Introduction, 97 VA. L. REV. iii (2011) (introducing symposium). 
29. POST, supra note 1, at 6–13. 
30. Post has argued for more than a decade in favor of a lexical priority of First Amendment 
theories. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2371 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Theory and Doctrine] (“[W]here the doctrinal 
implications of different prominent theories of the First Amendment collide, courts will tend to give 
priority to the participatory theory of democracy. But this does not mean that other theories do not 
continue to have weight and consequence when they are not inconsistent with the participatory 
theory.”); see also Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 617 (noting that “a certain degree of pragmatic 
simplification” is an “inevitable consequence” of describing constitutional principles that can be 
easily explained and feasibly implemented); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the 
Basis of American Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633, 679 (2011) (“[P]articipatory 
democracy is the worst theory of free speech, except for all the others.”).  
31. POST, supra note 1, at 18.  
32. Id. at 27–28. 
33. Id. at 17. As Post notes, giving citizens access to the public sphere and requiring 
governmental decision making to be rendered accountable to public opinion are “necessary for 
democratic legitimation; they are not sufficient.” Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 
482 & n.17; see also POST, supra note 1, at 21; Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation, 
and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 560 (2011) (“[I]t is worth noting that 
political participation and the public sphere are not co-extensive.”). Post has elsewhere called this 
the argument from participatory democracy. See Post, Theory and Doctrine, supra note 30, at 2367–
68 (describing “participatory” theory of democracy as “locat[ing] self-governance . . . in the 
processes through which citizens come to identify a government as their own”). 
34. POST, supra note 1, at 20. 
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(“political”),35 but does not depend on any one of them. Crucially, it is 
deeply grounded in current doctrine.36 It explains, for example, why First 
Amendment doctrine purportedly denies that there is such a thing as a 
“false idea” in public discourse,37 protects public employees speaking on 
matters of public concern (and less so when they are not),38 and erects 
high barriers to defamation claims when the plaintiff is a public figure.39 
Exploring these examples and others, Post presents democratic 
legitimation as “the most convincing account of the normative 
foundations of our First Amendment.”40 
Post has defended this account of the First Amendment’s underlying 
values elsewhere and at some length.41 The purpose of this Essay is not 
to revisit the question of whether democratic legitimation is the primary 
value of the First Amendment, but to explore the ways in which that 
value is or can be effectuated in doctrine. For even if one accepts 
democratic legitimation as the First Amendment’s central value, there 
remains the difficult question of determining how courts can recognize it 
at work.42 That is, in order to resolve actual cases, those who embrace 
the theory must be able to show whether particular speech acts implicate 
the value of democratic legitimation. 
Post’s primary solution is to say that the value of democratic 
legitimation is implicated when speech occurs within “public discourse.” 
Though this is not a necessary condition for First Amendment 
protection43—the value of democratic competence, after all, extends to 
speech that is not. Post argues that the line between speech inside and 
                                                   
35. See id. at 6.  
36. Post rightly regards this as an important quality of his or any other First Amendment theory. 
See id. at 4–5 (suggesting that “we can learn the purposes we have constructed First Amendment 
doctrine to achieve by tracing the contours of actual First Amendment coverage”); see also Post, 
Reply, supra note 3, at 617–18. 
37. See POST, supra note 1, at 29 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1979)). 
38. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006) (concluding that First Amendment 
coverage is triggered “in certain circumstances” when a government employee “speak[s] as a citizen 
addressing matters of public concern”). 
39. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring public officials 
to demonstrate “actual malice” in order to prevail in defamation cases). 
40. POST, supra note 1, at xii. 
41. See, e.g., Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3; Post, Reply, supra note 3. 
42. Elsewhere, Post has explained that regulations can fall within the scope of the First 
Amendment either because of “what content” they limit or “why” they do so. Post, Participatory 
Democracy, supra note 3, at 478 n.4 (“These logically distinct inquiries refer roughly to the object 
and purpose of a government regulation.”). My focus here is on the former.  
43. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 667 n.323 (“I do not mean to imply, of course, that 
the First Amendment protects only public discourse.”). 
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outside of public discourse is “the single most salient pattern of 
entrenched First Amendment doctrine.”44 Within public discourse, First 
Amendment doctrine generally avoids judgments about the truth of 
speech and truth generally,45 respects the speakers’ autonomy interests,46 
and treats all speakers as having equal value.47 Outside of public 
discourse, none of these things is true. 
But focusing on the boundaries of public discourse, rather than 
abstractly on the boundaries of democratic legitimation, simply reframes 
the definitional question: What constitutes public discourse? This is an 
extremely difficult48 and inherently normative49 question, whose answer 
is continually changing.50 Moreover, “[w]hether through its political or 
its judicial branches, governmental definition of the scope of public 
discourse is itself a regulation of public discourse . . . .”51 Post 
nonetheless concludes that although we do not “have a very clear or 
hard-edged account” of the boundaries of public discourse, “it is 
anthropologically apparent that they do exist and are reflected in 
constitutional doctrine.”52 
This Essay holds aside the institutional objections, which do not seem 
unique to Post’s theory, and focuses on a conceptual complication that 
might be: the degree to which the concepts of public discourse and social 
practices can do any work (in terms of driving the analysis) independent 
of the value of democratic legitimation. If the boundaries of First 
Amendment coverage depend on the mutually defining concepts of 
                                                   
44. POST, supra note 1, at 23. 
45. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“The First Amendment recognizes 
no such thing as a ‘false’ idea.” (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974))). As 
Post notes, however, the Court has also said that “there is no constitutional value in false statements 
of fact.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340; see also POST, supra note 1, at 29–31, 43–47 (suggesting that the 
distinction can be explained based on whether the purportedly false statements are part of public 
discourse). 
46. See POST, supra note 1, at 24. 
47. Id. at xiii. 
48. C. Edwin Baker, Is Democracy a Sound Basis for a Free Speech Principle?, 97 VA. L. REV. 
515, 516 (2011) (noting “the serious difficulty of identifying when the person is engaged in 
protected public discourse”).  
49. POST, supra note 1, at 15; see also Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 683 (noting “the 
startling proposition that the boundaries of public discourse cannot be fixed in a neutral fashion”). 
50. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 683 (“In the end . . . there can be no final account of 
the boundaries of the domain of public discourse.”). 
51. Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post’s and Meiklejohn’s Mistakes: 
The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1303, 1343 (2009) (emphasis added); see also Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 683–84 
(anticipating this objection). 
52. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 622–23. 
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public discourse and protected social practices, then those boundaries are 
disconnected from the underlying constitutional value of democratic 
legitimation. This is the problem Post’s theory seems to face. If instead 
the boundaries are based directly on whether particular speech acts 
further the value of democratic legitimation, the concepts of public 
discourse and protected social practices seem to be little more than 
conclusory labels.53 This is the problem manifested in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s “public concern” jurisprudence.54 The difficulty, then, is finding 
a way to effectuate the value of democratic legitimation without either 
ignoring or inflating the importance of public discourse and social 
practices, or separating them from the underlying importance of 
democratic legitimation itself. It may be helpful first to consider the 
possible flaws in the two alternatives just described. 
Post suggests that “[t]he contours of First Amendment 
coverage . . . be determined in the first instance by a normative inquiry 
into the forms of conduct we deem necessary for the free formation of 
public opinion.”55 It follows that “[p]ublic discourse includes all 
communicative processes deemed necessary for the formation of public 
opinion.”56 This is an approach grounded very heavily in the context of 
speech, rather than its content.57 It focuses on “communicative 
processes,”58 “forms of conduct,”59 “forms of social order,”60 “social 
practices,”61 and “social roles”62 rather than the content of speech itself. 
                                                   
53. Along similar lines, Eugene Volokh suggests that public discourse might simply be “a 
conclusory label for that speech which is most protected.” Eugene Volokh, The Trouble With 
“Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567, 573 (2011) 
[hereinafter Volokh, “Public Discourse”]. Post believes that this criticism overstates the case. Post, 
Reply, supra note 3, at 622.  
54. See infra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
55. POST, supra note 1, at 15. 
56. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 486. Post has noted elsewhere that “the very 
concept of a medium for the communication of ideas can be defined only by reference to the 
particular problems of public discourse.” Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1259. 
57. Baker, supra note 48, at 517 (noting that under Post’s theory, “content should not be relevant” 
(citing Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 486)). 
58. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 486. 
59. POST, supra note 1, at 15. 
60. Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1276–77 (“Instead of aspiring to articulate abstract 
characteristics of speech, doctrine ought to identify discrete forms of social order that are imbued 
with constitutional value, and it ought to clarify and safeguard the ways in which speech facilitates 
that constitutional value.”). 
61. Id. at 1278–79 (“Off on a quixotic search for the meaning of such concepts as ‘listeners’ 
reactions,’ the Court has once again failed to examine the particular social practices that actually 
give constitutional significance to its decisions.” (citation omitted)). 
62. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 622. 
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In sum, First Amendment values “do not attach to abstract acts of 
communication as such, but rather to the social contexts that envelop and 
give constitutional significance to acts of communication.”63 
The emphasis on context—what this Essay has called social 
practices—is prominent throughout Post’s work, and separates him even 
from other scholars who believe that participatory democracy is the 
primary value of the First Amendment. James Weinstein, for example, 
agrees with Post about the central values of the First Amendment,64 but 
defines public discourse as consisting of “speech on matters of public 
concern, or, largely without respect to its subject matter, of expression in 
settings dedicated or essential to democratic self-governance.”65 Post 
appears to omit, or at least de-emphasize, the content variable.66 And as 
he points out, hints of such a context-based approach can be found in the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that First Amendment coverage 
extends to practices that form a “significant medium for the 
communication of ideas,”67 even if the specific communication at issue 
does not successfully convey a particularized message.68 
Defining public discourse—and therefore the boundaries of 
democratic legitimation—based on context avoids some of the problems 
of the content-based approach, but raises problems of its own. One root 
complication is determining which contexts should be considered 
constitutive of public discourse and why. One possible answer is that 
public discourse consists of protected social practices such as print 
media. But that only begs the question of why those media (i.e., 
contexts) are protected while others are not, particularly because media 
of communication are so often changing. And it is unsatisfactory to say 
that they are protected because they constitute public discourse. That 
would be fully circular—the equivalent of saying that public discourse is 
protected because it consists of certain valuable social practices, and that 
those social practices are valuable because they constitute public 
discourse. Post occasionally seems to drift in that direction. For 
                                                   
63. Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1255; see also Post, Participatory Democracy, supra 
note 3, at 477–78 (“[T]he First Amendment does not and should not protect ‘speech as such,’ as 
Justice Souter once put it.” (citing Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478 
(1997) (Souter, J., dissenting))). 
64. See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free 
Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 497 (2011) (“[T]he value that best explains the pattern of free 
speech decisions is a commitment to democratic self-governance.”). 
65. Id. at 493 (emphasis added). 
66. See Baker, supra note 48, at 517 (noting the “added content criterion” in Weinstein’s theory). 
67. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952). 
68. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
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example, he has argued that “[s]peech is typically categorized as within 
or as outside of public discourse according to whether it occurs within 
social relationships that are regarded as requiring autonomy or 
interdependence.”69 As Edwin Baker recognized, this “creates some 
danger of circularity,” because “one suspects that Post would say that the 
relevant ‘political’ conception of autonomy makes whether a person is 
‘[w]ithin public discourse’ determinative of whether she should ‘be 
regarded as autonomous.’”70 
To be (relatively) clear, this circularity arises from the relationship 
between the concepts of public discourse and social practices, not 
necessarily from the concept of democratic legitimation itself. Indeed, 
one way to avoid the circularity is to focus directly on the value of 
democratic legitimation, extending constitutional protection to speech 
acts whose content is “normatively necessary for influencing public 
opinion.”71 Public discourse and protected social practices would then be 
defined as those contexts in which such speech is found. This may be 
consistent with current First Amendment doctrine. Indeed, Post has 
noted that “[c]ontemporary doctrine delineates the domain of public 
discourse primarily through an assessment of the content of speech.”72 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, “[s]peech deals with matters of 
public concern,” and is therefore entitled to more “rigorous” protection 
than “matters of purely private significance,”73 when it can be “fairly 
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern 
to the community or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that 
is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.”74 
The context, setting, and medium of the speech act seem relevant to this 
analysis75 only insofar as they suggest something about the content of 
the speech. 
                                                   
69. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 483. 
70. Baker, supra note 48, at 516; Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 484. 
71. POST, supra note 1, at 18. 
72. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 667. This assessment is now more than twenty years 
old, but recent cases like Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011), reinforce the fact 
that content—along with “form” and “context”—remains a touchstone of the Court’s analysis. Id. at 
1215. 
73. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215–16; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983); 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). By contrast, the Court has said that 
the First Amendment denies protection to speech on matters of “purely private concern.” Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (plurality opinion). 
74. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (concluding that the inquiry of “whether . . . speech 
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by . . . content, form, and context . . . as 
revealed by the whole record” (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48)). 
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Post rejects this content-based approach, concluding that in practice it 
has proven “ultimately inadequate and self-contradictory.”76 It is also 
hard to see how such an approach would give any weight to public 
discourse and protected social practices. If speech’s content determines 
whether it is entitled to First Amendment protection, public discourse 
and protected social practices are simply conclusory labels, and do no 
actual work. That is, if a speech act has been determined normatively 
necessary for influencing public opinion, it is already, by definition, 
entitled to constitutional protection under the principle of democratic 
legitimation. Calling it public discourse would simply be an additional 
label, one that reflects the relevant analysis but does not influence it. 
There is, however, a third way to conceptualize the relationships 
between public discourse, social practices, and democratic 
legitimation—one that gives weight to both content and context. In this 
view, social practices and public discourse serve as proxies for speech 
that further the value of democratic legitimation. Social practices are 
protected precisely because the content of speech within them is 
generally thought normatively necessary for influencing public opinion. 
Collectively, those social practices define the boundaries of public 
discourse. Speech acts occurring within public discourse presumptively 
further the value of democratic legitimation and are therefore entitled to 
First Amendment protection.77 Whether particular social practices 
contain such speech would be open to reevaluation over time.78 This 
approach would allow public discourse to carry weight in the analysis, 
but would tie its relevance to the value of democratic legitimation. 
Naturally, the proxy approach has complications of its own. Eugene 
Volokh raises one such complication when he argues that “defining the 
                                                   
76. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 675. 
77. I take Post to be arguing something similar when he says that each instance of speech in a 
protected medium should “presumptively” be protected “absen[t] . . . strong countervailing 
reasons.” POST, supra note 1, at 20. But his point seems to be an argument about the conditions 
under which speech in public discourse can be regulated (a question of protection) rather than, as I 
argue here, the conditions under which speech is recognized as being part of public discourse in the 
first place (a question of coverage). 
78. Such an approach would have much in common with the “institutional” approach to the First 
Amendment, which is premised on the idea that theory and doctrine should take note of the 
mediating institutions such as schools and the press that create and regulate speech. See PAUL 
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (forthcoming Harvard University Press 2012) 
(describing the institutional approach); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First 
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005) (same); see also Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821 (2008) (same). Post himself seems to disclaim the 
relationship, however, saying that the “premise of the institutional approach” is “implausible.” 
POST, supra note 1, at 51. 
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medium by what is shown in it . . . eliminat[es] the utility of medium as 
a proxy for the public discourse status of ‘each instance’ of the 
medium.”79 The thrust of this criticism is accurate, but not its 
conclusion. Defining protected forms of communication based on 
whether they contain protected content does raise the possibility that the 
value of the proxy will collapse. But that does not eliminate the proxy’s 
utility. If newspapers are considered protected media because they 
generally contain material that is thought normatively necessary to the 
formation of public opinion, the medium has been defined and protected 
based on what is shown in it. Nonetheless, in future cases, each instance 
of the medium could be presumptively protected without referring back 
to that content. That is the basic mechanism of all rules and categories,80 
and indeed is the heart of the “definitional balancing” approach to the 
First Amendment.81 
Moreover, the medium-as-proxy approach could display varying 
degrees of rigidity. If implemented in strict, rule-like fashion, it would 
mean strictly “presum[ing]”82 First Amendment coverage for speech acts 
within certain contexts or media. Those contexts and media could 
themselves be established by direct reference to whether speech within 
them is generally thought “normatively necessary” to the formation of 
public opinion.83 But in any individual case, courts would not ask 
whether the particular speech act at issue furthered that value.84 If 
implemented in a more standard-like fashion, the medium-as-proxy 
approach would simply create a rebuttable presumption that a speech act 
in a protected medium has content that furthers the value of democratic 
legitimation. The strength of that presumption could vary depending on 
the medium. 
Of course, all proxies are both under- and over-broad. Basing First 
                                                   
79. Volokh, “Public Discourse,” supra note 53, at 584. 
80. See, e.g., Kathleen Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992); see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism 
and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009). 
81. See generally Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees 
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1184–85 (1970) (describing definitional 
balancing approach). 
82. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 483.  
83. POST, supra note 1, at 18.  
84. Cf. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if 
confined to expressions conveying a particularized message, would never reach the unquestionably 
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis 
Carroll.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Amendment protection on context and social practices rather than 
individual speech acts would sometimes mean denying First Amendment 
coverage to speech acts occurring outside of traditionally recognized 
media of public discourse, even if their content would contribute to the 
formation of public opinion. It would also mean protecting speech acts 
based solely on the fact that they occur within a medium that frequently 
includes messages that do further constitutional values. The proxy would 
be an imperfect but implementable placeholder for constitutionally 
valuable speech. That principled but pragmatic approach seems 
consistent with the “fundamental aspiration” of Post’s work, which he 
has described as providing “an account of First Amendment doctrine that 
gives ‘considerable weight to ease of explanation and comprehension, 
feasibility of implementation in an imperfect institutional 
environment.’”85 That leads inevitably to “a certain degree of pragmatic 
simplification.”86 It also demands a kind of “reflective equilibrium” in 
which constitutional ideals and history are measured against one 
another.87 And perhaps the best way to illustrate that and the other issues 
raised here is by considering the First Amendment’s treatment of the 
press, which as Post has argued is deeply bound up with the concept and 
practice of public discourse. 
B. Democratic Legitimation and the Press 
The relationships between democratic legitimation, public discourse, 
and protected social practices are important in Post’s theory not simply 
for taxonomic purposes, but because constitutional coverage depends on 
their presence. The previous Part highlighted some conceptual 
difficulties with that relationship. This Part attempts, as Post urges, to 
evaluate it in light of “our historical commitments and principles.”88 
                                                   
85. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 617 (citing Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the 
Freedom of Speech: A Response to Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531, 531 (2011)). 
86. Id. 
87. POST, supra note 1, at 5 (“We can . . . aspire to what John Rawls has termed ‘considered 
judgment in reflective equilibrium.’” (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46–49 (1971))); 
Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 477 (“Determining the meaning of this 
commitment [to protect freedom of speech] involves reflective equilibrium; it requires us to 
interpret our history in light of our best ideals while simultaneously reexamining our ideals in light 
of our actual history.”).  
88. Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 618 (“Because law typically acquires authority from the 
commitments and principles of those whom it seeks to govern, I have sought to identify this 
fundamental purpose by inquiring into our historical commitments and principles.” (citing Robert C. 
Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative 
Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1474 (2007))). 
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Specifically, it asks how his theory can account for constitutional 
coverage of the press. 
Post accords constitutional protection to the press first and most 
prominently based on the democratic legitimation grounds sketched out 
above.89 The press, on this account, has a “unique” claim to First 
Amendment coverage because it—or rather the media through which it 
acts—helps form the public sphere.90 Indeed, Post argues that the public 
sphere took shape as a result of “the development of affordable and 
widely dispersed printed material, like books and newspapers,” which 
permitted strangers to “communicate systematically and regularly with 
each other.”91 It follows that “[m]edia like newspapers are major 
components of this structure and indeed are the historical grounds for its 
emergence. This is why First Amendment doctrine typically regards 
communication within recognized media as presumptively within public 
discourse and hence within the scope of the First Amendment.”92 Indeed, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has often referred to the importance of the 
press—a term which, significantly, is used interchangeably with “the 
media”—in creating and maintaining public discourse or, as the Court 
explained in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,93 “providing a 
forum for discussion and debate.”94 
Straightforward as it seems, however, this explanation raises a few 
potential complications. First is the context–content issue described in 
Part I.A. Post argued more than twenty years ago that “media speech, 
simply by virtue of the manner of its distribution, presents a strong prima 
facie claim to be classified as public discourse.”95 This is of course a 
claim based on context rather than content, and therefore raises the 
circularity problems discussed above. Those problems are exacerbated 
with regard to the press, given its central role in creating the public 
                                                   
89. Part II of this Essay considers whether the value of democratic competence might also be 
applicable. 
90. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 678 (“Media speech is thus unique because it carries 
within it this prima facie claim to constitute public discourse, a claim based entirely on the manner 
of its distribution rather than its content.”). 
91. POST, supra note 1, at 18; see also id. at 20 (“First Amendment coverage presumptively 
extends to media for the communication of ideas, like newspapers, magazines, the Internet, or 
cinema, which are the primary vehicles for the circulation of the texts that define and sustain the 
public sphere. In the absence of strong countervailing reasons, whatever is said within such media is 
covered by the First Amendment.” (footnote omitted)). 
92. Post, Participatory Democracy, supra note 3, at 486. 
93. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
94. Id. at 781. 
95. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 677–78 (emphasis added). 
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sphere. If media like newspapers effectively created public discourse, as 
Post argues, it seems unsatisfying to protect them simply on the basis 
that they are part of it. It may well be true that “[t]he emergence of the 
mass media and of the ‘public’ are mutually constructive 
developments.”96 However, that does not mean that the constitutional 
value of each can be rooted in the other. 
Second, as a matter of existing doctrine, it is simply not the case that 
all communications occurring in traditional media are given complete 
protection. A newspaper that prints libelous statements about private 
figures cannot claim constitutional immunity to tort,97 even though 
newspapers are “the primary vehicles for the circulation of the texts that 
define and sustain the public sphere.”98 Similarly, advertisements may be 
treated like commercial speech—and thus receive less-than-full First 
Amendment protection99—even when they appear in newspapers or 
magazines. Moreover, copyright laws are constitutional notwithstanding 
the fact that copyright-infringing speech often occurs within the 
traditional media that constitute public discourse.100 
These examples of unprotected speech in what would appear to be 
public discourse present some difficulties for Post’s theory, because its 
stated aim is to reflect doctrine as well as to shape it.101 As he notes, 
“[t]o determine the purposes of the First Amendment, therefore, we must 
consult the actual shape of entrenched First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”102 If entrenched First Amendment jurisprudence does not 
actually extend protection to “each instance of the [protected] 
medium”103 of newspapers or other media through which the press 
                                                   
96. Id. at 635 (quoting ALVIN GOULDNER, THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY: THE 
ORIGINS, GRAMMAR, AND FUTURE OF IDEOLOGY 106 (1976)). 
97. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (permitting private individuals to 
pursue defamation claims so long as negligence is proven). 
98. POST, supra note 1, at 20. 
99. Id. at 41–44. Post himself clarifies that commercial speech serves the value of democratic 
competence rather than democratic legitimation. Id. at 43. 
100. Volokh, “Public Discourse,” supra note 53, at 567–71; see also id. at 582 (“Securities law 
regulates, among other things, the contents of advertisements published in newspapers and 
magazines, as well as self-published pamphlets. Yet much obvious ‘public discourse’ is likewise 
published in newspapers, magazines, advertisements in those newspapers and magazines . . . and 
self-published pamphlets.”). 
101. POST, supra note 1, at 4; see also Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 617–18. 
102. POST, supra note 1, at 5; see also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Methodology in Free Speech 
Theory, 97 VA. L. REV. 549, 549 (2011) (reading Post’s theory as attempting to “provide the 
theoretical foundations to understand our existing practices, cases, and our historical traditions and 
thereby offer explanatory and justificatory cohesion for them”). 
103. Post, Recuperating, supra note 4, at 1253. 
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traditionally communicates, it seems wrong to treat the press as a social 
practice constitutive of public discourse (which is, by definition, 
presumptively protected). 
This problem is not unfamiliar to Post, however, and he has many 
potential responses to it. He has previously recognized that the media’s 
claim to First Amendment protection “is defeasible; obscene speech, for 
example, can be distributed through the mass media. But the existence 
and strength of the claim [of constitutional protection] makes the 
exclusion of media speech from public discourse difficult and 
controversial.”104 Perhaps these categories of speech are unprotected, 
even when conducted through mass media, precisely because they 
present the kinds of “strong countervailing reasons” sufficient to 
overcome the presumption of protection that attaches to the traditional 
mechanisms of public discourse.105 That explanation itself raises a host 
of difficult questions about what counts as a countervailing reason—
Lack of contribution to public discourse? Inequality of parties?—but it 
does help make sense of existing doctrine. Post might also say that the 
First Amendment’s treatment of some uncovered press activities—
defamation and obscenity, for example—represents an effort to mediate 
community values with those of public discourse.106 But that response 
also raises further complications. Among other things, it means allowing 
traditional social biases to define the boundaries of public discourse,107 
which as Post recognizes is itself a form of speech regulation.108 
A third potential problem with treating the press as constitutive of 
public discourse is that despite the seemingly strong support for press 
protection that Post’s theory and other sources provide, First 
Amendment doctrine does not reflect special solicitude for the press. 
The text of the First Amendment singles out the “press” for 
protection,109 of course, and the press has historically played a crucial 
                                                   
104. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 678. 
105. POST, supra note 1, at 20. 
106. See generally Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2; Robert Post, Community and the First 
Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473 (1997) [hereinafter Post, Community]. 
107. Redish & Mollen, supra note 51, at 1350 (“The theoretical inconsistency of this result is 
notable: after consistently undervaluing and underprotecting speech by ignoring its possible value to 
the audience, Post gives the audience’s perceived social norms a central role in justifying 
suppression of speech by allowing community norms to define the boundaries of the public 
discourse.”). 
108. See sources cited supra note 51. 
109. Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1028 (2011) (“Writing 
off the Press Clause as nothing more than the framers’ gentle reminder that we all have a right to 
publish our speech is problematic on several levels.”). 
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role in creating and maintaining the public sphere.110 As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he Constitution specifically selected the 
press, which includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but 
also humble leaflets and circulars, to play an important role in the 
discussion of public affairs.”111 If, as Post argues, such activities and 
forms of communication actually created the public sphere,112 shouldn’t 
they be accorded heightened constitutional protection? At the very least, 
it would seem that First Amendment doctrine should extend protection 
to core press activities like claims of privilege and access to 
information.113 
Yet First Amendment doctrine does not necessarily cover these 
activities, and indeed gives few legal protections to the press as such.114 
Branzburg v. Hayes115 is exemplary. In that case, the Court recognized 
that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,”116 
a careful phrase that might suggest, but does not actually deliver, a 
special set of constitutional protections for the press. Specifically, the 
Court declined to give journalists a First Amendment right to withhold 
information about confidential sources from a grand jury investigating 
criminal behavior.117 Similarly, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia,118 the Court ringingly endorsed the notion that “without some 
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated.”119 But even as it recognized a general constitutional right 
of public access to certain kinds of judicial proceedings, the Court did 
not give the press any greater share of that right than the public at 
large.120 
                                                   
110. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
111. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (citations omitted). 
112. POST, supra note 1, at 18; see also id. at 20. 
113. See Vincent Blasi, Democratic Participation and the Freedom of Speech: A Response to 
Post and Weinstein, 97 VA. L. REV. 531, 534 (2011) (“A First Amendment that valued participation 
in public discourse above all else would, I should think, recognize an access right of the sort 
proposed by Jerome Barron and roundly rejected by the Court.”). 
114. West, supra note 109, at 1028 (“The Supreme Court occasionally offers up rhetoric on the 
value of the free press, but it steadfastly refuses to explicitly recognize any right or protection as 
emanating solely from the Press Clause.”). 
115. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
116. Id. at 707. 
117. Id. at 690–91. 
118. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
119. Id. at 576 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681). 
120. Id. at 577 n.12 (“[M]edia . . . representatives are entitled to the same [right of access to 
criminal trials] as the general public.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010) (“We have consistently rejected the proposition that 
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The result of this, doctrinally, is that the press as such receives no 
constitutional protection, but receives First Amendment coverage for the 
same reasons and to the same degree as other speakers in public 
discourse. As Post explains: 
Media speech is . . . unique because it carries within it this prima 
facie claim to constitute public discourse, a claim based entirely 
on the manner of its distribution rather than on its content. This 
singularity explains the Court’s continual attraction to a 
distinction between media and nonmedia defendants. But on 
close inspection the uniqueness of media speech lies only in the 
particular way in which it grounds its claim to be public 
discourse, a claim whose substance it shares with many other 
kinds of communication.121 
This explanation is descriptively accurate, and yet somewhat 
unsatisfying. Even if other forms of speech employ similar manners of 
distribution, the very fact that media speech is, by Post’s reckoning, 
“unique,” suggests that it should be treated differently. Perhaps Post 
would say that his book is focused on the limits of First Amendment 
coverage rather than the degree of protection it bestows,122 and thus that 
the question of whether the press should receive heightened protection is 
simply beyond his scope. But that, too, is unsatisfying, because First 
Amendment doctrine includes widely varying tests for different kinds of 
covered speech.123 Given that Post’s stated aim is to account for the 
shape of current doctrine,124 the issue of differential coverage would 
seem to fall squarely within his reach. 
A fourth and related difficulty with First Amendment treatment of the 
press is not specific to Post’s theory, but may highlight another 
complication with it. That is the intractable problem of determining who 
or what counts as the press—a task whose difficulty might explain why 
the press is not given special treatment in current First Amendment 
doctrine.125 It is made all the more acute by the changing nature, role, 
                                                   
the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he rights of the institutional media are no 
greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations engaged in the same 
activities.”). 
121. Post, Public Discourse, supra note 2, at 678. 
122. See POST, supra note 1, at 1, 96. 
123. See generally Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three 
Acts, 31 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1982) (exploring differences between coverage and protection). 
124. See sources cited supra note 36. 
125. See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[A] 
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and mechanisms of the press. Chief among these, perhaps, is the easy 
accessibility of publication, for example on the Internet. If we are all 
journalists now,126 maybe there is no point in creating special protection 
for the press. In fact, extending First Amendment protection to particular 
forms of communication traditionally employed by the institutional press 
could exacerbate problems of over- and under-breadth. The 
characteristic media associated with the press—newspapers and 
magazines, among others127—often convey information that is not in any 
real sense a matter of public discourse. Commercial advertisements, for 
example, appear in traditional media and yet do not serve the value of 
democratic legitimation.128 Conversely, a focus on traditional media 
would fail to capture many modern means of maintaining the public 
sphere. In the recent democratic revolutions across the Middle East, for 
example, social media such as Twitter—“traditional” only in the loosest 
sense of the term—effectively functioned as the press.129 
These definitional difficulties are not unique to the press, of course. 
Many organizations doing business under the name “university” are 
devoted to the pursuit of some particular political or social end other 
than the creation of knowledge. Post concludes that “[f]rom a 
constitutional point of view, . . . academic freedom has nothing to do 
with the autonomy of institutions that happen to include the name 
‘university’ in their titles.”130 Rather, it covers only “institutions that 
facilitate the application and improvement of professional scholarly 
standards to advance knowledge for the public good.”131 Perhaps 
                                                   
fundamental difficulty with interpreting the Press Clause as conferring special status on a limited 
group is one of definition.”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972). But see Floyd 
Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 580 (1979) (“In the great preponderance of cases, a court has little difficulty 
knowing a journalist when it sees one.”).  
126. See generally SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW: THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF 
THE PRESS AND RESHAPING OF THE LAW IN THE INTERNET AGE (2007); DAN GILLMOR, WE THE 
MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE (2d ed. 2006). 
127. See POST, supra note 1, at 20 (listing these as among the media traditionally constituting 
public discourse). 
128. Id. at 42. 
129. See generally, e.g., TWEETS FROM TAHRIR: EGYPT’S REVOLUTION AS IT UNFOLDED, IN THE 
WORDS OF THE PEOPLE WHO MADE IT (Alex Nunns & Nadia Idle, eds. 2011). 
130. POST, supra note 1, at 78; see also id. at 90 (“True universities that protect academic 
freedom, and that are accordingly entitled to claim the protection of academic freedom, 
are . . . dedicated to the disciplinary diffusion of knowledge and to the disciplinary discovery of new 
knowledge. It is only in such circumstances that universities serve the constitutional value of 
democratic competence.”). 
131. Id. at 78. 
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“journalists” are only entitled to First Amendment protection when and 
to the degree they respect the norms and rules of the discipline.132 But 
defining protected media based on their disciplinarity is an answer 
grounded in the value of democratic competence, not democratic 
legitimation. Indeed, the very idea of disciplinarity is antithetical to the 
notion of democratic legitimation. The following Part explores this 
interaction. 
II.  EXPERT KNOWLEDGE AND THE PRESS 
Though democratic legitimation is the cardinal value in Post’s theory 
of free speech,133 his book’s cardinal contribution may be its exploration 
of a different and in some sense contradictory value: democratic 
competence. This value, he says, “refers to the cognitive empowerment 
of persons within public discourse, which in part depends on their access 
to disciplinary knowledge.”134 Indeed, what sets his work apart from any 
other thoroughly elaborated First Amendment theory is the serious 
attention it pays to the production of expert knowledge through means 
that are hard to reconcile with familiar First Amendment principles. Yet 
Post does not focus as much attention on related and important questions 
such as how expert knowledge is disseminated into public discourse, 
how it is or should be treated once it arrives there, whether knowledge 
dissemination itself requires disciplinarity, and what institutions and 
social practices besides universities are engaged in disseminating expert 
knowledge. Part II.A addresses some of these questions. Part II.B 
suggests that perhaps the press, as a disseminator and occasional 
producer of expert knowledge, should be entitled to constitutional 
protection under the principle of democratic competence. 
A. Expert Knowledge in Public Discourse 
As Post notes, intelligent self-governance requires expert 
knowledge.135 It follows that “[r]eliable expert knowledge is necessary 
                                                   
132. Cf. Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privilege for 
the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 629 (1979) (“[A]ll citizens exercising the press 
function, including, but not limited to, journalists employed by the ‘institutional press,’ 
warrant . . . protection.” (emphasis in original)). 
133. POST, supra note 1, at 37 (“[T]he value of democratic legitimation trumps that of democratic 
competence.”). 
134. Id. at 33–34. 
135. Id. at 32 (“Expert knowledge is prerequisite for intelligent self-governance.”); see also id. at 
34 (“Cognitive empowerment is necessary both for intelligent self-governance and for the value of 
democratic legitimation.”); id. at ix (“Any modern society needs expert knowledge in order to 
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not only for intelligent self-governance, but also for the very value of 
democratic legitimation.”136 This simple fact raises a significant problem 
for the First Amendment. Expert knowledge “can be produced only if 
the norms and practices of a discipline are observed,”137 and “[t]he 
continuous discipline of peer judgment, which virtually defines expert 
knowledge, is quite incompatible with deep and fundamental First 
Amendment doctrines” such as those governing viewpoint and content 
neutrality.138 Thus “[i]f expert knowledge depends upon the preservation 
of disciplines, and if disciplines require maintenance of ‘proper and 
orderly action,’ the very independence jealously safeguarded by the First 
Amendment is in tension with the production of expert knowledge.”139 
Post concludes that “[b]y maintaining a continuous tension between state 
authority to regulate expert knowledge practices on the one hand, and 
the relative constitutional autonomy of such knowledge practices on the 
other, we recognize and honor the need to negotiate between these two 
important social needs.”140 
But negotiating between those two social needs, as opposed to simply 
embracing their incompatibility, requires accounting for how expert 
knowledge is disseminated into public discourse and how it is or should 
be treated once it arrives. These are essential questions, for the very 
value of democratic competence depends on the role of expert 
knowledge in public discourse. As Post argues, “[d]emocratic 
competence refers to the cognitive empowerment of persons within 
public discourse, which in part depends on their access to disciplinary 
knowledge.”141 The U.S. Supreme Court has similarly explained that it 
interprets the First Amendment with the goal of “securing , , , an 
informed and educated public opinion with respect to a matter which is 
of public concern.”142 
Post devotes the second chapter of the book to the question of 
“whether we can discern distinct First Amendment doctrines designed to 
                                                   
survive and prosper.”); id. at 35 (“[A]n educated and informed public opinion will more 
intelligently and effectively supervise the government.”). 
136. Id. at 32–33. 
137. Id. at xi. 
138. Id. at 9; see also id. at 31 (“The creation of reliable disciplinary knowledge must accordingly 
be relegated to institutions that are not controlled by the constitutional value of democratic 
legitimation.”). 
139. Id. at xiii. 
140. Id. at 98–99. 
141. Id. at 33–34 (emphasis added). 
142. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940). 
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protect the social practices that produce and distribute disciplinary 
knowledge.”143 In answering that question, he focuses primarily on 
commercial speech doctrine, “which vigorously protects the 
dissemination of factual information outside of public discourse.”144 
That doctrine is also “antithetical to First Amendment protections for 
public discourse,”145 because, among other things, it permits speech to 
be limited on the basis of its truthfulness. Post concludes that 
“[c]onstitutional protections for the dissemination of expert knowledge 
should . . . be roughly analogous to those applicable to the circulation of 
commercial information.”146 And “[i]f we wish to make visible our 
existing constitutional instincts in this area, we must scrutinize domains 
outside of public discourse.”147 
The harder question, however, is how the First Amendment should 
treat the dissemination of expert knowledge into or within public 
discourse. One answer might be that the dissemination of expert 
knowledge into public discourse is itself a form of public discourse. But 
Post does not seem to believe this. He writes that “classrooms are a 
primary medium for the transmission of scholarly expertise to the 
public,”148 and yet “[t]he classroom is not a location in which the value 
of democratic legitimation is at stake.”149 This only makes sense if 
media through which expertise is transmitted to the public are not 
necessarily part of public discourse. 
Moreover, at a conceptual level, there are good reasons to think that, 
under Post’s theory, the dissemination of expert knowledge should not 
itself be treated as a form of public discourse—at least not automatically. 
We do not value expert knowledge, or its dissemination, on the basis of 
                                                   
143. POST, supra note 1, at 33. 
144. Id. at 34–35. 
145. Id. at 43. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. (emphasis added). It is possible, of course, that modern doctrine is simply wrong to treat 
commercial speech as being outside of public discourse. Indeed, by Post’s own description, 
“commercial speech tends to be addressed to the general public in advertisements that are placed in 
newspapers or radio or other media that are widely distributed.” Id. at 46. But this is an argument 
Post has addressed elsewhere and at length, and I will not revisit it here. See Robert Post, The 
Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (2000) (concluding that 
commercial speech falls outside of public discourse because it “should be understood as an 
effort . . . simply to sell products” and not “to engage public opinion”); see also Redish & Mollen, 
supra note 51, at 1346 (criticizing this argument). 
148. POST, supra note 1, at 88. 
149. Id. at 70; see also id. at 83 (“In these lectures Sweezy did not play the role of a citizen; he 
was not participating in public discourse. He was an expert communicating knowledge to his 
students and thereby to the public.” (citation omitted)). 
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experts’ interest in experiencing authorship of the laws that bind them, 
as an emphasis on public discourse would suggest.150 Rather, we value 
the dissemination of expert knowledge precisely to the degree that it 
informs listeners. And that is a value that public discourse and the 
principle of democratic legitimation struggle to capture. 
Perhaps instead dissemination of expert knowledge counts, at least 
presumptively, as public discourse when it occurs through the social 
practices traditionally recognized as constituting public discourse: 
newspapers, magazines, and the like. As Post explains: 
[C]ommunication of expert knowledge within public discourse 
is typically protected by the value of democratic legitimation, 
which can obscure the distinct protections inspired by 
democratic competence. If an expert chooses to participate in 
public discourse by speaking about matters within her expertise, 
her speech will characteristically be classified as fully protected 
opinion.151 
But that simply highlights the problem, for public discourse does not 
recognize truth,152 let alone expert knowledge. All people can claim 
expertise in public discourse, whether or not the “knowledge” they 
transmit is a product of disciplinarity.153 As Post’s account reveals, their 
speech “will characteristically be classified as fully protected 
opinion.”154 That is fine so far as it goes, but absent some endorsement 
of a marketplace-of-ideas rationale, it is hard to see how transmuting 
knowledge to opinion aids the dissemination of knowledge. 
The difficult question, therefore, is how expert knowledge can retain 
its character in public discourse. It is not enough to “maintain[] 
separation between the ‘sphere of knowledge’ and the ‘sphere of 
power,’”155 for the value of democratic competence lies precisely in the 
fact that (expert) knowledge informs (governing) power. One possibility, 
of course, would be for law to take an active role in separating fact from 
opinion and protecting claims of expert knowledge, even in public 
                                                   
150. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
151. POST, supra note 1, at 43; see also Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First 
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939 passim (exploring 
the distinction between a dentist who publicly argues against the use of amalgams, thereby engaging 
in public discourse, from the dentist who privately counsels her patients to avoid them, thereby 
speaking outside of public discourse and subject to sanction). 
152. Supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
153. POST, supra note 1, at 44 (“Members of the general public can rely on expert 
pronouncements within public discourse only at their peril.”). 
154. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
155. Id. at 59. 
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discourse. After all, “the value of democratic competence can be 
judicially protected only if courts incorporate and apply the disciplinary 
methods by which expert knowledge is defined.”156 Having done that, 
and thereby effectively given a legal advantage to disciplinary 
knowledge—an advantage which must matter, else Post would not 
advocate it—why not simply continue to do so even as the knowledge 
moves in public discourse? 
The fact that Post rejects this option reflects his belief that democratic 
legitimation trumps democratic competence, at least in public discourse. 
Within public discourse, he says, the state may not “enforce the 
disciplinary methods that make expert knowledge reliable.”157 When the 
press operates within public discourse, for example, any checks on its 
speech must be extra-legal: “Biologists can with impunity write 
editorials in the New York Times that are such poor science that they 
would constitute grounds for denying tenure within a 
university. . . . Such pronouncements are ultimately subject to political 
rather than legal accountability.”158 This is in keeping with the basic 
theory and value of democratic legitimation. 
But in order for democratic competence to succeed on its own terms, 
there must be some method of accountability, legal or otherwise, for 
claims of expertise in public discourse. Without more—that is, without 
an account of why and how people in public discourse will be able to 
separate truth and expert knowledge from falsehood and chicanery—the 
basic premise that expert knowledge will inform participatory 
democracy will fail. A First Amendment theory predicated on the value 
of expert knowledge in public discourse must have some way to account 
for how that truthful expertise will be transmitted. 
One answer would be to posit a hard line between expert knowledge 
and public discourse, such that the two co-exist but never interact. 
Perhaps individuals accumulate expert knowledge outside of public 
discourse and then enter into public discourse, where their previous 
accumulation of knowledge improves their ability to engage. On this 
account, expert knowledge would never really be a part of public 
discourse, but a part of preparation to engage in such discourse. Post 
seems to have this in mind when he explores commercial speech 
doctrine, which concerns “the circulation of information outside of 
public discourse,”159 but is worthy of First Amendment coverage 
                                                   
156. Id. at 54. 
157. Id. at 44. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
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because it “prevents the state from obliterating independent sources of 
expert knowledge”160 while “empower[ing] democratic citizens to 
demand accountability from their government.”161 
This is a very attractive explanation. Equipping people to understand 
and evaluate concepts in public discourse is obviously important, and 
surely there is First Amendment value in encouraging individual 
cognitive development outside of public discourse. But it seems hard to 
maintain the division between expert knowledge “in” public discourse 
and expert knowledge “before” public discourse. If the point of 
knowledge is to inform public discourse, at some point it must enter into 
it. Post says, for example, that the restriction on attorney–client 
communications that the U.S. Supreme Court considered in Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States162 can be understood to trigger 
First Amendment coverage because “its purpose and effect was to block 
the communication of knowledge that might ultimately inform public 
opinion and thereby enhance the competency of democratic decision-
making” even though “this knowledge is communicated outside public 
discourse.”163 
This leads to a second and related potential answer to the question of 
how expert knowledge can prove valuable in public discourse: Such 
knowledge will be recognized for what it is, and will gain acceptance 
over less worthy claims. This is, of course, a version of the marketplace-
of-ideas metaphor, which suggests that free speech is valuable precisely 
because truth will ultimately win out in competition with falsehood.164 
Though participatory democracy is Post’s primary First Amendment 
principle, he also believes that the marketplace metaphor captures 
                                                   
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 60. 
162. 559 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010). The relevant language provided: 
A debt relief agency shall not (4) advise an assisted person or prospective assisted person to 
incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing a case under this title or to pay an 
attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer fee or charge for services performed as part of 
preparing for or representing a debtor in a case under this title. 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C § 526 (a)(4) (2006). 
163. POST, supra note 1, at 52–53; see also id. at 61 (“The value of democratic competence is 
undermined whenever the state acts to interrupt the communication of disciplinary knowledge that 
might inform the creation of public opinion.”). 
164. See also Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a 
Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. REV. 595, 595 (2011) (“[N]early all speech restrictions 
that interfere with the search for truth also interfere with the right to ‘participate in the formation of 
public opinion.’”); cf. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED 
PRINTING 45 (H.B. Cotterill ed., MacMillan & Co. 1959) (1644) (“Let [truth] and falsehood 
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?”). 
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something important about the value of free speech. He notes at the 
outset of the book, “I focus on the marketplace of ideas from a slightly 
different angle. I inquire into the relationship between the marketplace 
of ideas and the production of expert knowledge.”165 
But this interpretation relies on a potentially problematic view of the 
marketplace of ideas and how individuals within it respond to claims of 
expertise. Post believes that “[w]e rely on expert ‘knowledge’ precisely 
because it has been vetted and reviewed by those whose judgment we 
have reason to trust.”166 Thus, for example, “[w]e regard scientific 
beliefs as reliable because they are subject to disciplinary standards of 
verifiability, reproducibility, falsifiability, and so on.”167 Post goes on to 
endorse Allen Buchanan’s argument for the necessity of “the social 
identification of experts, that is, epistemic authorities, individuals or 
groups to whom others defer as reliable sources of true beliefs.”168 
This effort to join democratic competence and public discourse is 
extremely appealing, but raises conceptual and practical problems. At a 
conceptual level, the same “unrestrained epistemic egalitarianism” that 
is “incompatible with the division of epistemic labor necessary for the 
production of expert knowledge”169 also seems incompatible with the 
identification of those authorities who are doing the producing. In other 
words, if public discourse does not permit recognizing expert 
knowledge, then it is hard to see how it permits recognizing the 
authorities, institutions, and practices responsible for creating such 
knowledge. 
Moreover, as a practical matter, there is some reason to doubt that 
people actually do recognize or value claims of expert knowledge in 
public discourse. As Suzanna Sherry has pointed out, “we have created a 
society that finds experts unnecessary and even faintly suspect. . . . More 
people believe in angels than in evolution, and belief in evolution only 
narrowly surpasses belief in UFOs. Elected officials and candidates 
publicly deny the validity of facts on which there is scientific 
consensus.”170 At the very least, this raises serious empirical questions 
                                                   
165. POST, supra note 1, at xi (emphasis added). Again, it is worth noting that Post’s emphasis is 
on the production of knowledge, not its dissemination. 
166. Id. at 8. 
167. Id. at 29. 
168. Id. at 32 (citing Allen Buchanan, Political Liberalism and Social Epistemology, 32 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 95, 103 (2004)). 
169. Id. at 32 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
170. Suzanna Sherry, Democracy’s Distrust: Contested Values and the Decline of Expertise, 125 
HARV. L. REV. FORUM 7, 10 (2011). 
07 -- Blocher FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:20 AM 
2012] PUBLIC DISCOURSE, EXPERT KNOWLEDGE, AND THE PRESS 437 
 
about whether and to what degree expert knowledge actually does 
inform democratic decision-making. If it does not, Post’s faith in the 
marketplace as a mechanism for joining democratic competence and 
democratic legitimation is misplaced. The apparent distrust of expert 
knowledge—surely an important issue for Post’s theory—may in fact be 
a result of the failure to recognize disciplinarity. As Sherry puts it, “the 
main culprit in encouraging resistance to expert knowledge . . . is the 
democratization of the creation and authoritativeness of knowledge.”171 
Rehabilitating faith in expert knowledge may be both an essential goal 
of Post’s theory and a prerequisite for its success. 
Another way to mediate the interface between democratic 
legitimation and democratic competence might be through focusing 
more specifically on the mechanisms by which expert knowledge is 
disseminated. If such knowledge can only be created through 
disciplinarity, perhaps its proper dissemination also requires 
disciplinarity, at least insofar as the principle of democratic competence 
is concerned.172 Indeed, disciplinarity with regard to the transmission of 
expert knowledge might be particularly important, because the recipients 
of that knowledge are likely to be less informed than the experts 
disseminating it, thus eliminating the egalitarian presumption that 
applies in public discourse.173 But disseminating expert knowledge 
implicates different norms and forms of disciplinarity than the 
production of knowledge. Failed academic enterprises, for example, 
might not directly contribute to the production of expert knowledge, but 
they can nonetheless be relevant to its accurate transmission. If a lab has 
tried ten times to achieve a desired result (desired, perhaps, because it 
would satisfy a major funder), succeeds on the tenth occasion, and then 
publishes a paper reporting only the successful result, it has produced 
expert knowledge. But it has arguably failed to transmit other relevant 
knowledge—the identity of the funder, the amount of funding, the 
failure of the previous nine tests, and so on. 
The disciplinarity of knowledge-creation within such scholarly 
settings has been an interest of Post’s for many years,174 and is the 
                                                   
171. Id. at 10; see also id. at 11 (“Segments of the American public seem to have 
domesticated . . . postmodern skepticism by combining it with democratic anti-elitism, ultimately 
trusting only knowledge that is created by democratic means.”). 
172. Cf. POST, supra note 1, at 90 (referring to the “disciplinary diffusion of knowledge”). 
173. See generally Post, Community, supra note 106; Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24 (2006). 
174. See, e.g., MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES 
OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM (2009) (describing the historical development and 
contemporary principles of Amendment academic freedom). 
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primary focus of his discussion of democratic competence. He argues 
that “[u]niversities and university faculty are the unique and primary 
sites in American society for the creation and diffusion of disciplinary 
knowledge in the service of the public good.”175 The former role—
creation of knowledge—seems true enough. But are universities really 
the primary sites through which such knowledge is “diffuse[d]” into 
public discourse? Certainly some dissemination of expert knowledge 
happens through teaching. As noted above, however, Post believes that 
“[t]he classroom is not a location in which the value of democratic 
legitimation is at stake.”176 It follows that teaching in university 
classrooms is not a form of public discourse. But if it is not, when does 
the knowledge transmitted through teaching enter into public discourse? 
If students debate the day’s lecture while walking back to their 
dormitory, surely they are engaged in public discourse.177 What if they 
go to the professor’s office to discuss it further, set up an off-campus 
lunch meeting with her, or relay the lecture’s contents to other students 
not in the class? 
Post generally holds aside the role of teaching in the distribution of 
expert knowledge,178 focusing instead on research and publication.179 
But there must be social practices other than scholarly research and 
publication that create and distribute disciplinary knowledge into public 
discourse.180 The following Part considers whether the press is one. 
B. Democratic Competence and the Press 
Part I.B argued among other things that the value of democratic 
legitimation provides strong but imperfect support for First Amendment 
protection of the press: strong, because it would give constitutional 
protection to the press on the basis that it virtually constitutes public 
                                                   
175. POST, supra note 1, at 68; see also id. at 63 (referring to the modern university’s role in the 
“dissemination” of knowledge (citations omitted)). 
176. Id. at 70; see also id. at 69 (“These lectures formed no part of public discourse, because 
Sweezy’s relationship to the students in his classroom constituted a professional relationship, 
analogous to the relationship between a lawyer and her clients.”). 
177. But see Post, Reply, supra note 3, at 623 (calling it a “close case” whether “family 
conversations about presidential politics should be protected as public discourse”). 
178. POST, supra note 1, at 70, 77 n.56, 88. 
179. Id. at 88 (arguing that “research and publication . . . includes the right to disseminate the 
results of research to the public, including and most especially to students in the classroom”); see 
also id. (“Academic freedom of research and publication must include, at a minimum, the freedom 
to communicate the results of research to students when it is pedagogically relevant to do so.”). 
180. Id. at 96 (“The practices of astrology and palmistry would not qualify, but those of 
chemistry, law, and medicine probably would.”). 
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discourse; imperfect, because it cannot fully explain many prominent 
features of First Amendment doctrine. Nor, for that matter, does it fit 
well with the usual arguments for constitutional protection of the press—
things like informational benefits to readers and the checking function of 
the press, rather than journalists’ autonomy interests, as the democratic 
legitimation approach would suggest. 
Moreover, the democratic legitimation value, standing alone, cannot 
account for the press’s own internal disciplinarity, including basic 
editing standards. What of those activities that are not themselves part of 
public discourse, but which are nonetheless necessary for effective 
dissemination of information—newsgathering, for example? If 
knowledge dissemination requires its own forms of disciplinarity—of 
internal regulation, norms, and discipline—then presumably much of 
what makes knowledge dissemination work occurs outside of public 
discourse. 
These questions suggest that democratic legitimation alone is not 
enough to account for First Amendment protection of the press. There is 
some reason to think that democratic competence can help fill the gap, 
though Post himself does not argue as much. For one thing, the press 
disseminates knowledge, including expert knowledge. As Justice Powell 
recognized, “[n]o individual can obtain for himself the information 
needed for intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities. . . . [The 
press] is the means by which the people receive that free flow of 
information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government.”181 Much, 
though of course not all, of the “information and ideas essential to 
intelligent self-government” consists of expert knowledge relayed by 
press pundits. Powell also argued that laws are constitutionally suspect 
when they “restrain[] the ability of the press to perform its 
constitutionally established function of informing the people on the 
conduct of their government.”182 Powell happened to be writing in 
dissent in both of those cases, but the ideas he expressed have long had 
broad appeal. In Branzburg, for example, the Court concluded that “[t]he 
function of the press is to explore and investigate events, inform the 
people what is going on, and to expose the harmful as well as the good 
influences at work.”183 
In addition to reporting expert knowledge, the press can sometimes 
produce it. Indeed, the very purpose and function of investigative 
                                                   
181. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
182. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
183. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 722 (1972). 
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journalism is to report previously unknown facts.184 When Woodward 
and Bernstein discovered, assembled, and synthesized the Watergate 
story,185 or Andrew Ross Sorkin wrote Too Big to Fail,186 they were 
surely producing knowledge akin to that created by a university-based 
scholar. Perhaps one might argue that investigative journalism uncovers 
knowledge, rather than creating it. But that seems too fine a distinction. 
Scientists, too, are largely in the businesses of uncovering pre-existing 
facts about the natural world,187 though no one doubts that by doing so 
they are adding to the sum total of human knowledge. 
Together, these roles—the dissemination and occasional creation of 
expert knowledge—suggest that the press, like academia, should receive 
First Amendment protection under the principle of democratic 
competence. But of course there is another essential ingredient that the 
press must possess in order to gain protection under the value of 
democratic competence: disciplinarity. Although the press may not 
exhibit the same forms of disciplinarity as academia, it does have its 
own internal rules. Like academia, the press has adopted formalized 
internal rules and mechanisms of control.188 Professional trade 
organizations such as the American Society of Newspaper Editors and 
the Society of Professional Journalists,189 as well as by individual 
newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters create and enforce such rules. 
Among other things, these disciplinary rules require caution when 
dealing with sources who request anonymity, and “advise journalists to 
refuse to reveal confidential sources to any court or investigative 
entity.”190 Journalists who fail to adhere to these or other rules of the 
                                                   
184. See Hugo de Burgh, Kings Without Crowns? The Re-Emergence of Investigative Journalism 
in China, 25 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 801, 806 (2003) (defining investigative journalism as 
“extensive research by one or more journalists to uncover matters which affect the citizenry of the 
society in which the journalist lives and of which the society generally does not approve but is 
unaware”). 
185. CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (1974). 
186. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND 
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2009). 
187. Of course, they do so in ways that an individual’s untrained senses could not. This is why, to 
take the example with which Post begins the book, we rely on experts to show us that cigarettes 
cause cancer, but not to prove the existence of oak trees in our yards. POST, supra note 1, at ix. But 
journalists, too, uncover facts that an individual’s untrained senses could not. 
188. Patrick Garry collects and discusses these rules. See Patrick J. Garry, Assessing the 
Constitutional Autonomy of Such Non-State Institutions as the Press and Academia, 2010 UTAH L. 
REV. 141, 152–53 (2010). My explanation here is drawn from his. 
189. Id. at 152 (“In 1922, the American Society of Newspaper Editors introduced the first ethical 
guidelines, called the ‘Canons of Journalism.’”). 
190. Id. (citing American Newspaper Guild, Code of Ethics, Canon 5 (1934), reprinted in THE 
NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY 567 (George L. Bird & Frederic E. Merwin eds., 1942)). 
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discipline are regularly disciplined through social or employment-related 
sanctions.191 
Journalistic disciplinarity may well extend, albeit in different forms, 
beyond the institutional press. As noted above, the boundaries of the 
press have changed significantly, to the point that perhaps we are all 
truly journalists now.192 But even the non-institutional press—citizen 
journalists and the blogosphere, for example—has its own norms, many 
of which are rigorously enforced. These norms include linking to other 
sources, having open comments sections, admitting errors, and not 
“hijacking” comments threads.193 Writers who fail to adhere to them are 
sanctioned through mockery, shunning, and loss of readership and status, 
which for many bloggers and citizen-journalists are the primary reasons 
to write at all. These may not seem like concrete harms comparable to a 
denial of tenure, but in a world where reputation and social capital are 
driving forces, the incentive to adhere to social standards is significant. 
Inasmuch as these disciplinary norms limit journalists’ autonomous 
speech in the name of some other value, the press has much in common 
with academia. A professor who fails to adhere to the standards of 
research and publication in her field will be denied tenure 
notwithstanding whatever autonomy interest she has in her research. 
Similarly, journalists are not free to pursue their own individual interests 
free from any institutional constraints. Their speech, in other words, is 
not protected on the basis of their autonomy, but because it is produced 
in accordance with the norms of their discipline. Post argues that 
scholarship is worthy of First Amendment protection precisely when and 
because it respects disciplinary norms.194 Journalism, on this account, 
may be entitled to solicitude on the same basis. 
Extending constitutional protection to the press based on the principle 
of democratic legitimation would entail some major shifts in First 
Amendment jurisprudence. As Post notes, “the value of democratic 
competence can be judicially protected only if courts incorporate and 
                                                   
191. See, e.g., Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception, N.Y. TIMES, May 
11, 2003, at N1 (detailing wrongdoings of disgraced Times reporter Jayson Blair, who fabricated 
stories); SHATTERED GLASS (Lions Gate Films 2003) (relating the story of journalist Stephen Glass, 
who was fired for fabricating stories). 
192. See GANT, supra note 126. 
193. See, e.g., Jacqueline D. Lipton, What Blogging Might Teach About Cybernorms, 4 AKRON 
INTELL. PROP. J. 239 (2010) (discussing the development and identification of norms in the 
blogosphere). 
194. POST, supra note 1, at 90 (arguing that only universities that are “dedicated to the 
disciplinary diffusion of knowledge and to the disciplinary discovery of new knowledge” are 
entitled to protection under the principle of democratic competence). 
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apply the disciplinary methods by which expert knowledge is 
defined.”195 Courts would therefore need to incorporate and apply the 
press’s disciplinary methods. That could mean giving constitutional 
protection to such press methods as anonymous sourcing (a reporters’ 
privilege) and newsgathering (a right of access). But it would also mean 
that the state could police journalists in much the same way as it polices 
commercial or professional speech—to ensure that they are fulfilling the 
functions that entitle them to protection in the first place. That would in 
itself be a very high price to pay.196 Whether the argument from 
democratic legitimation is a normatively attractive one for the press 
therefore requires far more attention than this Essay has been able to 
give it. 
CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Essay has been to explore two ways in which the 
tools Post employs seem to work awkwardly together. Part I attempts to 
illustrate a few possible complications with the relationships between 
public discourse, social practices, and the value of democratic 
legitimation. If the first two concepts are disconnected from the third, 
the justification for protecting public discourse and social practices 
seems circular or unprincipled. But if they are fully dependent on the 
value of democratic legitimation, they become no more than conclusory 
labels for protected speech. Using public discourse as a continually 
evolving proxy for speech that is “normatively necessary for influencing 
public opinion”197 addresses both of these problems to some degree, 
though admittedly raises a new set of complications. 
Part II suggests that the relationship between public discourse and 
expert knowledge—and therefore between democratic legitimation and 
democratic competence—is even more problematic than Post has 
recognized.198 He has not yet explored the mechanisms by which that 
dissemination happens, whether dissemination requires its own forms of 
disciplinarity, and how expert knowledge can retain its status as such 
after it enters public discourse. It is to all of our advantage, however, that 
the expert knowledge in his book has entered that discourse. 
It would be impossible for any book, even one by Robert Post, to 
fully explain both the characteristics of participatory democracy and the 
                                                   
195. Id. at 54. 
196. I am very grateful to Robert Post for pointing this out to me. 
197. POST, supra note 1, at 18. 
198. Id. at xiii. 
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methods by which expert knowledge is produced and disseminated. 
Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom comes about as close as 
any one book possibly could to achieving these crucially important 
goals. In doing so, it has also illuminated the deep tension between them. 
Mediating that tension, however, remains one of the central and 
intractable challenges for First Amendment theory and doctrine. 
 
